The implications of these results are generally sobering. There is already an emerging consensus that the 1926-2002 historical average return on broad market indexes such as the S&P 500 are probably higher than likely future performance. Our results imply that the best forecasts of compound growth rates for future investments are even lower than the estimates emerging from this new strain of research.
The impact of these considerations on forecasts of future portfolio value can be dramatic. Compounding at the arithmetic average return calculated from sample periods of either the most recent 77 or 52 years results in forecasts of future value for a sample of countries that are roughly double the corresponding unbiased forecasts based on the same data periods. Indeed, for reasonable risk and return parameters, at investment horizons of 40 years, the difference in forecasts of total return generally will exceed a factor of two.
The percentage differences between unbiased forecasts versus forecasts obtained by compounding arithmetic or geometric average returns increase with the ratio of the investment horizon to the sample estimation period, as well as with the imprecision in the estimate of the mean return. For this reason, emerging markets present the greatest problem. These markets present historical estimation periods that are particularly short, and return histories that are particularly noisy. For these markets, therefore, the biases analyzed in this paper can be especially acute. Even for developed economies, which offer longer histories, there can be significant bias if one disregards data from very early periods because it is considered less predictive of future performance.
Geometric or Arithmetic Mean: A Reconsideration
Increased concern for long-term retirement planning, the associated growth of the defined-contribution investments market, and proposals for Social Security reform have all focused considerable attention on forecasts of long-term portfolio returns. Moreover, recent academic studies 1 suggest that conventional estimates of long-term performance, This paper returns to an old controversy in the forecasting of long-term portfolio performance: given a historical data series from which one estimates the mean and variance of portfolio returns, should one forecast future performance using arithmetic or geometric averages? Finance texts 2 generally (and correctly) note that if the arithmetic mean of the portfolio's stochastic rate of return is known, an unbiased estimate of cumulative return is obtained by compounding at that rate. Despite this advice, many in the practitioner community prefer geometric averages, which are necessarily lower than arithmetic averages.
1 Fama and French (2002) and Jagannathan, McGratten and Scherbina (2000) show that estimates of expected return derived from a dividend discount model are substantially lower than historical average returns. This suggests that U.S. experience has turned out better than market participants expected, rendering historical averages greater than equilibrium risk premia. In addition, more inclusive data bases result in lower historical risk premia. See for example, Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002) , which shows that extending U.S. data to earlier historical periods reduces historical average returns.
We show in this paper that the practitioners are on to something. The proper weights applied to the two averages depend on the ratio of the investment horizon to the length of the sample period used to estimate the mean return.
When the forecast horizon is very short relative to the sample period, the weight on the arithmetic average return is close to 1.0; in this case, the "textbook wisdom" is correct.
However, as the horizon extends, the weight progressively shifts in favor of the geometric average. At a horizon equal to the historical sample period, the weight on the geometric average reaches 1.0, and "practitioner wisdom" is correct. At even longer horizons, the weight on the geometric average exceeds 1.0, while that on the arithmetic average is negative, implying unbiased compounding rates below both the arithmetic and geometric averages.
The implications of these results are quite sobering. There is already an emerging consensus (see footnote 1) that the 1926-2002 historical average returns on broad market indexes such as the S&P 500 are probably higher than likely future performance. We conclude that the best forecasts of future compound growth rates are even lower than the estimates emerging from this new strain of research.
In the next section we show why unbiased estimators of mean return result in overestimates of compound portfolio growth rates. We illustrate there that the bias is a function both of the imprecision of the estimate and of the horizon for which portfolio performance is forecasted. We present, easy to use, exact formulas for this bias in the standard case that returns are log-normally distributed. The formula indicates a simple correction for bias, which involves the weighted average of the arithmetic and geometric average. In Section 2, we examine some implications of our results and demonstrate that this bias can be substantial, certainly large enough for significant implications for longterm planning. We show that the bias tends to be more severe when there is a shorter history of returns or when returns are more variable, making these issues particularly important for emerging markets. Empirical estimates in this section demonstrate that potential bias in these markets is enormous. Section 3 concludes
Forecasting Cumulative Returns with Noisy Estimates
Suppose the rate of return on a stock portfolio is log-normally distributed. If the stock price today, at time t, is denoted S t , then ln(S t+1 /S t ) has a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 . Over an investment horizon of H periods, if returns are independent from one period to another, the cumulative return on the portfolio will also be log-normally distributed: ln(S t+H /S t ) has a normal distribution with mean µH and variance σ 2
H.
For any historical sample of stock returns, the geometric average rate of return is defined as the compound growth rate of portfolio value over the investment period.
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Suppose for example that we have observed stock prices over a sample period starting T periods ago (i.e., starting at time t − T) and ending today, at time t. If the initial value of the portfolio was S t−T , then the geometric average rate of return, g, is defined by
S t−T e gT = S t
or equivalently,
Because in each period, the expected value of ln(S t+1 /S t ) equals µ, the geometric average return is an unbiased estimator (in fact, the maximum likelihood estimator) of µ.
However, it is a well-known feature of the lognormal distribution that if ln(S t+1 /S t )
has mean µ, then the expected value of S t+1 equals S t e µ + ½σ 2 . Thus, the expected rate of growth in portfolio value expressed at a continuously compounded rate is µ + ½ σ 2 . This quantity is the arithmetic mean rate of return, which exceeds the geometric mean by ½σ 2 .
After an investment horizon of H periods, the unbiased forecast of future portfolio value is therefore
Equation (2) is the basis of the "textbook rule" that to forecast future value, one should compound forward at the mean arithmetic return.
The difference in these approaches can be empirically significant. We estimate the arithmetic mean by computing the growth in portfolio value each period (i.e., S t+1 /S t ) and then calculating the sample period average. This average is the estimate of S t e µ + ½σ 2 .
We estimate the geometric mean from equation (1 For more volatile investments such as small stocks, the difference in arithmetic and geometric average is even larger.
However, an often-overlooked presumption of the textbook formula is that the forecaster knows the true values of the parameters µ and σ. In practice, of course, these are estimated, and even using the best estimation techniques, the estimators are subject to sampling error.
One might think that simply substituting unbiased estimates of µ and σ into equation (2) would provide unbiased estimates of future portfolio value. In fact, this is common practice. For example, Ibbotson Associates simulates future portfolio values in SBBI by compounding forward using the historical arithmetic average as in equation (2).
Unfortunately, even if the estimate of µ is unbiased and σ is known 4 , the forecast of future portfolio value will be biased, possibly quite severely. The reason for this result is that e (µ + ½σ 2 )H is a non-linear function of µ. Symmetric errors in the estimate of µ therefore have asymmetric effects on the forecast of S t e (µ + ½σ 2 )H . Positive estimation error has a greater impact than an equal-magnitude negative error. Therefore, even if the estimate of µ is unbiased, with estimation error centered around zero, the estimation error in S t+H will be upward biased. length of the sampling period and cannot be enhanced by sampling more frequently. Merton (1980) demonstrates this result rigorously.
[ Figure 1 here]
If the underlying stock price process is log-normal, it is relatively easy to derive the exact bias in the forecast. 5 If we estimate µ using equation (1), then our estimate, μ, equals the geometric average return over the sample period of length T. The standard error of μ is σ/ T . The (noisy) forecast extends for H periods, resulting in a standard deviation of the forecast equal to σH/ T , and variance σ 2 H 2 /T. Thus, estimation error in µ increases the range of possible values we may infer for final portfolio value: in addition to the "irreducible noise" due to economic uncertainty (measured by σ), we add additional noise by using an estimate of µ to forecast. We know from equation (2) that adding variance to a log-normal return increases the forecast of cumulative portfolio growth by one-half the variance of cumulative return. Hence, the upward bias resulting from the extra volatility associated with sampling error is e ½σ 2 H 2 /T . Note that the bias increases in both investment horizon, H, and volatility, σ (which will make our statistical estimates less precise). Conversely, bias declines with T, because longer sample periods increase the precision of our estimates. Table 1 computes this bias as a function of investment horizon, volatility, and sample estimation period. The table demonstrates that using reasonable parameters, the bias can be dramatic, especially when volatility is high, or the sample period is short. In these cases, 30 or 40-year forecasts can be biased by factors of 2 or more.
5 A more formal derivation of this formula for bias may be found in Eric Jacquier, Alex Kane, Alan J.
Marcus, "Optimal Forecasts of Long-Term Returns and Asset Allocation: Geometric, Arithmetic, or Other
Means?" working paper, 2002. Blume (1974) first discusses the bias in forecasted portfolio value. However, because he assumes that returns are normally rather than log-normally distributed, he does not obtain exact formulas for expected values or bias. A log-normal specification is also preferable as it rules out returns below −100%.
[ Table 1 here]
We conclude that while the expected future value at horizon t + H of a portfolio currently worth $1 can be described by equation (2), we may not simply substitute an estimate of µ such as the historical geometric average into this formula. As noted,
substituting μ for µ adds extra variability to the distribution of portfolio values, and results in the following bias:
Equation (3) does, however, indicate how one can adjust the estimate of the compound growth rate of the portfolio to render the forecast of portfolio value unbiased.
Suppose we start with the sample estimate of the continuously compounded arithmetic average rate of return, i.e., μ + ½ σ 2 , but then reduce this estimate by the amount ½ σ 2 H/T.
Call this modified estimator µ* + ½ σ 2 . This reduction is just sufficient to undo the bias associated with the use of μ:
Thus µ* + ½ σ 2 is the compound growth rate that provides unbiased estimates of future portfolio value. Now notice that this growth rate is a weighted average of the geometric and arithmetic averages with weights that depend on the ratio of the investment horizon to the sample estimation period 6 :
The growth rate that gives an unbiased forecast of final portfolio value will be very close to the arithmetic average for very short investment horizons (i.e., for which H/T is close to zero). But as the horizon extends, the weight on the geometric average increases. Therefore, µ* falls as horizon lengthens. For H = T, the unbiased forecast compounds initial portfolio value at the geometric average return. For even longer horizons, one would apply a weight greater than 1.0 to the geometric average, and a negative weight to the arithmetic average, resulting in a growth rate below either the geometric or arithmetic mean.
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This analysis sheds light on an apparent paradox. Suppose we assume that returns come from a distribution that is stable over time. In that case, the 76-year historic return from the SBBI data base ending in 2001 would be a reasonable (albeit imprecise) estimate of cumulative return over the next 76 years. Compounding at the historic geometric average over a 76-year horizon would (by construction) match the proportional growth in wealth realized over the past 76 years. In contrast, compounding at the sample arithmetic average for 76 years (as typically prescribed by the literature) would necessarily give a forecast of growth in wealth greater than the one realized historically. Following standard practice thus ensures a forecast of future portfolio growth that exceeds historic experience. The bias correction described in equation (6) shows that this forecasting exercise (with T = H = 76 years) actually would call for compounding at the geometric average, so that the forecast of 76-year cumulative return would match that experienced historically.
Indicative biases
Is the potential bias in forecasts of cumulative returns economically significant?
Unfortunately, it seems to be.
Assume that μ = .10 and σ = .20. still is subject to an upward bias of about 50 percent at a horizon of 40 years. Using longer sample periods, T, the arithmetic forecast obviously performs better; however, the stability of the underlying return process at ever-longer horizons becomes increasingly suspect.
Symmetrically, for long T, the geometric estimator can be severely downward biased.
Using T = 76 years of data and an investment horizon of H = 40 years, for example, the geometric forecast of final wealth is only about 60 percent of the unbiased forecast.
The tradeoff between long sample periods (which would increase precision when the underlying return process is stable) versus truncated sample periods (which disregard old and possibly no-longer-representative experience) is highlighted in Table 2 , which presents 40-year return forecasts for a small sample of countries based on historical sample periods of different lengths. The longest series available from Datastream for France, Germany, and the U.K. are well more than a century in length. For the U.K, with a 201-year data span, the arithmetic average return is almost equal to the unbiased compounding rate even for a horizon as long as 40 years. But notice for these countries that the estimates of µ over these long periods are far lower than estimates derived over the last 82 years, and smaller still than estimates based on the latest 52 years. Do we conclude that the estimates based on longer data series are more reliable by virtue of their higher sample size, or that structural change over the last century or two makes returns from the nineteenth century of dubious value for predicting twenty-first century returns?
We would point out that regardless of how one might answer this question, arithmetic averages based on relatively recent experience will result in compounding rates that are far too high, at least for these countries. If we accept the long-duration estimates, the resulting values of μ are far lower than estimates obtained from more recent periods. In contrast, if we rely on only more recent data we obtain higher μ, but now the unbiased estimator gives higher weight to the (lower) geometric average (since H/T is larger). In either case, the compound growth rates that give unbiased forecasts of cumulative returns are substantially below results using conventional arithmetic averages.
The impact of these considerations on forecasts of future portfolio value is dramatic.
For any of these countries, compounding at the arithmetic average return calculated from sample periods of either the most recent 82 or 52 years results in forecasts of future value that are roughly double the corresponding unbiased forecasts based on the same data periods.
Emerging markets present an even greater problem. At the bottom of Table 2 , we present estimates for Hong Kong and the MSCI emerging market index (both in dollardenominated returns), where available data span only 17.6 or 13.6 years respectively, and volatility is high (especially for Hong Kong). With such short historical estimation periods, the unbiased forecast of future value at H = 40 is below both the geometric and arithmetic forecasts, and by enormous margins. For the emerging market index, with T equal to only 13.6 years, the unbiased forecast is only 3.1% the forecast obtained by compounding at the arithmetic average, and is only 10.1% of the compound geometric average.
Conclusion
A longstanding debate on forecasting future portfolio value has focused on the relative merits of the geometric versus arithmetic average return as a compounding rate. We have shown in this paper that when these averages must be estimated subject to sampling error, neither approach yields unbiased forecasts. For typical investment horizons, the proper compounding rate is in-between these two values. Specifically, unbiased estimates of future portfolio value require that the current value be compounded forward at a weighted average of the arithmetic and geometric rates. The proper weight placed on the geometric rate equals the ratio of the investment horizon to the sample estimation period. Therefore, for short investment horizons, the arithmetic average will be close to the "unbiased compounding rate." However, as the horizon approaches the length of the estimation period, the weight on the geometric average approaches 1. For even longer horizons, both the geometric and arithmetic average forecasts will be upward biased.
We demonstrate that these biases can be empirically significant. For investment horizons of 40 years, for example, the difference in forecasts of cumulative performance easily can exceed a factor of two. The percentage differences in forecasts grows along with the investment horizon, as well as with the imprecision in the estimate of the mean return.
For future research we reserve questions concerning the robustness of our results to distributional assumptions concerning rates of return. From preliminary research (Jacquier, Kane and Marcus, 2002 ) the results appear robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. We also address there forecasting criteria other than unbiasedness, for example, minimum mean squared error forecasts. These forecasts also depend critically on the ratio of the investment horizon to the sample estimation period, and present qualitatively similar patterns as those presented in this paper. Figure 2: Forecasts of final portfolio value. Initial investment = $1. Annual returns are assumed to be log-normal with parameters μ = .10 and σ = .20. Forecast of final value using arithmetic average return is A = e ( μ + ½ σ 2 )H , using arithmetic average return is G = e μ H . The unbiased forecast is U = e ( µ* + ½ σ 2 )H which amounts to compounding forward at a rate equal to a weighted average of the geometric and arithmetic averages with weights H/T and 1 − H/T. Panel (a) presents forecasts of final value Panel (b) presents ratios of the arithmetic or geometric forecast to the unbiased forecast.
